NASA's Role in Aeronautics:  A Workshop.  Volume 5:  Rotorcraft by unknown
NASA-CR-164517 
I 'llei? J (JO / 7 tt Cj , 
NASA'S ROLE 
IN AERONAUTICS: 
A Workshop 
Volume V Rotorcraft 
NOV ?i O·'} ,-I NOT TO gr:; '[A!,:::!\, FEG,',j TWS /WO,'I 
.LANGLEY RESEARCH CENE!1 
LIBRARY. NASA 
HAMPTON, VIRGINIA 
. 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 1 
NF01759 ' 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19810017496 2020-03-21T12:05:35+00:00Z
I s: 
Volume V Rotorcraft 
Report to the Workshop by the Panel on Rotorcraft 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board 
Assembly of Engineering 
National Research Council 
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 
Washington, D.C. 1981 
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved 
by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members 
are drawn from the Councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the 
National Academy of Engineering, and the Insti tute of Medicine. The 
members of the committee responsible for the report were chosen for 
their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. 
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors 
according to procedures approved hy a Report Review Commi ttee 
consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the 
Natjonal Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. 
The National Research Council was established by the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of 
science and technology with the Academy's purposes of furthering 
knowledge and of advising the federal government. The Council 
operates in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy 
under the authority of its congressional charter of 1863, which 
establishes the Academy as a private, nonprofit, self-governing 
membership corporation. The Council has become the principal 
operating agency of both the National Academy of Sci~nces and the 
National Academy of Engineering in the conduct of their services to 
the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering 
communi ties. It is administered jointly by both Academies and the 
Institute of Medicine. The National Academy of Engineering and the 
Institute of Medicine were established in 1964 and 1970, respectively, 
under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences. 
This report and the study on which it is based were supported by 
Contract No. NASW-2342 between the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration and the National Academy of Sciences. 
Copies of this publication are available from: 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board 
National Research Council 
2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20418 
WORKSHOP ON 
THE ROLE OF NASA IN AERONAUTICS 
Edward S. Carter, Chairman 
Director of Technology 
Sikorsky Aircraft Division 
United Technologies Corporation 
Holt Ashley 
Professor, Department of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics 
Stanford University 
Richard L. Ballard 
Chief, Technology Support Team 
Aviation Systems Division 
Department of the Army 
B. Paul Blasingame 
Retired Manager, Santa Barbara 
Operations 
Delco Electronics Division 
General Motors Corporation 
Arnold Brooks 
Manager, Advanced Engineering 
Program 
General Electric Company 
Glen A. Gilbert 
Glen A. Gilbert Associates 
ROTORCRAFT PANEL 
Harlan S. Hosler 
Chairman, Helicopter 
Operation Task Forces 
Office of Aviation Safety 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
John Kerr 
Vice President, Engineering, 
Research and Development 
Hughes Helicopters 
Division-Summa Corporation 
Stanley Hartin 
Director, Advanced Product 
Design and Development 
Bell Helicopter Textron 
iii 
James R. Nelson 
Chief, Helicopter Systems 
Branch 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
William Walls 
Director of Technology 
Boeing Vertol 
The Boeing Company 
This Page Intentionally left Blank 
PRE F ACE 
Aeronautics is changing in many significant respects. The impli-
cations of this are so far-reaching as to call into question the future 
position of the United States in world aviation. 
The magnitude of this question, with its possible consequences for 
the nation's economy and security, led the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) to seek an independent evaluation from the 
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB) of the National Research 
Council's Assembly of Engineering. Specifically, the ASEB was asked 
to assess the nature and implications of the current state of U. S. 
aviation In a world setting and their significance for NASA's role in 
the nation's aeronautical future. 
The ASEB responded by convening a workshop July 27 through 
August L, 1980, at the National Academy of Sciences' Woods Hole Study 
Center. The workshop was structl,1red into four panels covering mili-
tary aviation, transport aircraft, general aviation, and rotorcraft. 
In addition, an overview panel was formed to consider NASA's role in 
research as well as its relationships with other elements of the aero-
nautics community. 
The central task of the workshop was to examine the relationship of 
NASA's aeronautical research capabilities to the state of U.S. aviation 
and to make recommendations about NASA's future roles in 'aeronautics. 
NASA and its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (NACA), traditionally have maintained a cooperative relation-
ship with the aeronautical indust ry, with other government agencies 
concerned with aircraft operations and regulations, and with the aca-
demic community engaged in aerospace research. This triumvirate was 
taken into account in planning the workshop and selecting the partici-
pants. Thus, representatives from each part of the aeronautical com-
munity were invited, and information on NASA's relationship with each 
was the subject of special presentations prior to the working sessions. 
Representation from industry was predominant because industry's rela-
tionship with NASA is considered to be a key element in examining the 
present and future roles of NASA. 
Th'e members of the workshop panels represented, in total expertise 
and experience, all of the important sectors of aeronautics: military 
aircraft and missiles; commercial air transports; general aviation; 
v 
rotorcraft; university and private research; airline operations; and 
government regulatory agencies. In addition, the participants also 
included representatives of other industries--notab1y, automotive, 
electronics, and steel. Including the speakers and other nonpanel 
members, close to 80 individuals participated. 
The participants were asked to address the issue of NASA's role in 
the context of a wider discussion concerning: the status and dimen-
sions of u.S. aeronautics; the key aeronautical problems and opportuni-
ties that are likely to be amenable to research and technology develop-
ment; the historical evolution and accomplishments of NASA in aeronaut-
ical research and technology development; and possible alternatives to 
NASA. Each of these subjects is discussed thoroughly in separate panel 
reports. 
The report of the workshop consists of seven volumes: 
I Summary 
II Report of the Panel on Military Aviation 
III Report of the Panel on Transport Aircraft 
IV Report of the Panel on General Aviation 
V Report of the Panel on Rotorcraft 
VI Report of the Overview Panel on Aeronautical Research 
VII Background Papers--The Outlook for Aeronautics and Relevant 
Areas 
In order to help focus the discussion, NASA officials developed and 
provided a concise set of definitions of eight possible roles for NASA: 
National Facilities and Expertise; Research; Generic Technology Evolu-
tion; Vehicle Class Technology Evolution; Technology Demonstration; 
Technology Validation; Prototype Development; and, Operations Feasi-
bility. Because some of these roles differ, depending on the aeronau-
tical discipline involved, the roles are assessed within six principal 
aeronautical disciplines: aerodynamics, structures and materials, pro-
pulsion, electronics and avionics, vehicle operations, and human 
engineering. Definitions of these roles and disciplines are contained 
in Appendix A. The matching of the roles and disciplines is treated 
in Volumes II-VI and summarized in Section II of Volume I. 
The workshop participants were extensively briefed by officials 
from NASA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), by leaders from the aviation manufacturing and 
operating industries, and by a member of Congress. The briefings are 
to be found in Volume VII. 
Each panel separately considered the national benefits produced 
within the dimensions of its sector and the relative state of the 
sector's \lorld position; each considered the evolution of NASA's role, 
vi 
as well as a rationale for NASA's aeronautical support of its sector; 
and, finally, each panel produced sector-oriented conclusions and 
recommendations for NASA's roles for the future. Although there are 
obvious overlaps, the similarities and differences in each of the 
panels' findings are preserved in the separate reports of the sector-
oriented panels, Volumes II-V. 
This document, Volume V, presents the findings and recommenda-
tions of the Panel on Rotorcraft. 
vii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The commonality of concerns for rotorcraft and the rest of the 
aeronautical technologies is apparent in some of the other panel 
reports. Beyond this, rotorcraft are different from the rest in a 
number of ways, which shape the rotorcraft community's perception of 
NASA's role in aeronautics in several respects. The factors that tend 
to set rotorcraft apart include the following: 
o The technology is extremely complex. Until now, the 
of the dynamic and aerodynamic problems faced by 
designers has forestalled numerical analysis in 
sense. Such analysis involves a large number 
degrees of freedom and an extremely intricate set 
n~mic interactions. Only recently, with the advent 
high-speed computers, has it become feasible to 
analysis of the whole problem. 
complexity 
rotorcraft 
any total 
of dynamic 
of aerody-
of powerful 
attempt an 
o System-level demonstrations play a larger role in the rotor-
craft program. In rotorcraft there is a close interaction 
among the dynamic, aerodynamic, and aeroacoustic elements of 
the problems. Thus, new solutions and concepts must be demon-
strated almost always at the systems level before their value 
can be established. 
o Rotorcraft technology is relatively immature, so the opportu-
nities for progress are very great. In the past, the resources 
for rotorcraft technology development allocated by both govern-
ment and industry have represented only a small fraction of 
those allocated to more conventional elements of the aircraft 
industry. Consequently, with far more difficult problems to 
solve and far fewer resources for the attack, much of rotor-
craft technology remains an empirical "black art" rather than 
a practical science. Rotorcraft technology is 20 to 30 years 
behind that of fixed-wing aircraft. As a result, it stands to 
reason that enormous improvements in rotorcraft efficiency and 
comfort can still be achieved. 
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o The European aircraft industry has been more competitive in 
rotorcraft than in other fields of aeronautics. Since a high 
technology approach to rotorcraft design has only become 
possible recently, European industry has been able to parallel 
U. S. efforts easily. Already, the total employment of the 
European industry closely approximates that of the United 
States. Foreign competition in the world rotorcraft market has 
been significant. Moreover, foreign rotorcraft have been 
matching U.S. rotorcraft in highly visible ways for some time. 
Both French and Soviet designs have alternated with U.S. 
designs in achieving world speed records. The Soviet Union 
currently holds the record with its HIND D. Furthermore", 
although U.S. research facilities for rotorcraft are generally 
superior to those in the rest of the world, Europeans are 
developing more advanced facilities to deal with such problems 
as noise and icing research in special wind tunnels. 
o The divergence of civil and military requirements has begun to 
affect the rotorcraft market only recently. The rotorcraft 
industry traditionally has depended upon derivatives of mili-
tary designs to meet civil requirements. Now, however, mili-
tary aircraft have become so specialized that they are no 
longer suitable as a basis for competitive civil designs in the 
small and medium classes. Table 1 illustrates this problem. 
Rotorcraft to meet such civil sector needs as the provision of 
certain public services can no longer depend on further 
improvements in technology developed for military purposes. 
TABLE 1 Black Hawk 
Military Attributes 
• Threat Survivability 
• Rapid Maneuverability 
• World Wide Capability 
• Ease of Air Transportation 
• " Reliability and Maintainability 
• Crashworthiness 
Civil Market Penalty 
• Weight 
Irrelevant Features 
• Excessive Installed Power 
Optimized for Low Speed 
• Excessive Installed Power 
Dynamics-Heavy Design 
• Design Constrained 
Cabin Size Unacceptable 
• None 
• None 
o Noise is a greater problem for rotorcraft than for fixed-wing 
aircraft. By the very nature of their missions, rotorcraft 
operate nearer clusters of population. Thus, acceptable noise 
levels become a critical factor for rotorcraft. ~fuile new 
Federal Aviation Administration ruling on reducing rotorcraft 
noise to acceptable levels is considered imminent, the manu-
facturers claim that the current technology base for meeting 
the requirement is far from adequate without a significant 
economic sacrifice. Research is urgently needed to bring the 
2 
rotorcraft state-of-the-art to the point at which fixed-wing 
aircraft stood when noise rules were implemented for those 
aircraft. 
o Although the social benefits of rotorcraft are hard to measure, 
they appear to be unique. The applications of rotorcraft are 
more varied than that of any other aircraft. Thus, the ration-
ale for rotorcraft research and development can be based on 
grounds other than transportation and defense. These benefits 
of rotorcraft are discussed in greater depth in the next 
section. 
3 
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STATUS AND DIMENSIONS OF THE ROTORCRAFT SECTOR OF THE 
AVIATION COMMUNITY 
The dimensions of the rotorcraft sector of the U. S. aviation 
community can be measured in several ways. In number of employees, the 
major U.S. helicopter companies are relatively small compared to the 
U.S. fixed-wing companies. The four major U. S. manufacturers--Be11, 
Sikorsky, Boeing Verto1, and Hughes--emp10y approximately 28,000 
people, while their European counterparts--Aerospatia1e (France), 
Westland (U .K.), Agusta (Italy), and HBB (West Germany)--emp10y about 
25,0001 • To the extent that the number of employees is indicative 
of production capacity and product development resources, the European 
companies are strong competition for the U.S. rotorcraft industry. 
Uilitary Usage 
Despite its relatively small size in comparison with the fixed-
wing aircraft industry, the U.S. rotorcraft industry has provided a 
majority of the aircraft bought by the Department of Defense. Hore 
than half of the 29,836 aircraft procured for the U.S. military between 
FY 66 to FY 79 were helicopters. These statistics are admittedly 
influenced by the large number of helicopters procured to support the 
U.S. military in Vietnam, but this does.not diminish their importance. 
Rather, it points up the fact, suggested also by the earlier Korean 
conflict, that helicopters are vital in the type of limited conflict 
that the U.S. has had to address. With each conflict the need for 
greater capability and sophistication has been clear. The role of 
helicopters, as envisioned by military planners, will continue to 
expand, especially as the new generation of helicopters developed in 
the 1980s becomes operational. 
The Civil Harket 
Based on historical trends and recent market surveys it is pos-
sible to predict the status of the U.S. rotorcraft industry at the end 
of this decade. Figure 1 shows that the market for civil helicopters 
in the U.S. and Canada has grown steadily from 1960 through 1979 and 
projects additional growth through 1990. 2 Two growth rates are 
indicated: an 8 percent rate, which is based only on the expansion of 
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existing markets, and a 12.5 percent rate, which is based on average 
annual growth during the last two decades. The higher rate might be 
anticipated if rotorcraft continue to find new markets as they have in 
the past. Regardless of which growth rate is assumed, the number of 
helicopters operating in the civil market in the U.S. and Canada will 
more than double by 1990. 
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Source: Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nov. 1979, Technical Challenges in Developing the New Wave of Small and 
Medium Helicopters, Jame. A. Atkins. 
FIGURE 1 Growth Forecast-Light & Medium Helicopters 
United States and Canada 
In a 1975, forecast of the world helicopter market, Aerospatiale 
estimated that 27,000 helicopters would be sold in the 10 years to 
1985. Of these, 13,000 would be sold in North America (all assumed to 
be commercial). 3 This corresponds with the 12.5 percent growth rate 
in helicopters projected in Figure 1 for the same period. 
World Market Projections 
Two U.S. companies, Bell Helicopter Textron and Sikorsky Aircraft, 
independently have estimated the world helicopter market for the decade 
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of the 1980s. Bell reckons on a market of 26,000 units with a total 
value of $21 billion4 and Sikorsky, 29,000 units worth $29 
billion. S 
The range of estimates from $21 to $29 billion represents only 
part of the total market in the decade. Past experience shows that 
during the seven-to-ten year flight life of a helicopter it is likely 
to require maintenance and support services that double the value of 
the initial procurement costs. If this ratio prevails during the 
1990s, helicopter sales during the decade will range from $42 to $58 
billion. If the same market growth projected for the decade of the 
1980s prevails during the decade of the 1990s, the world helicopter 
market will once again double to about $80 to $120 billion, including 
support requirements. . 
The rationale for such growth projections is straightforward. 
First, the helicopter is still a technological infant, and, while some 
of its identifiable markets are increasing rapidly, a significant part 
of its growth potential is in applications not clearly foreseen. (See 
Figure 1). Through technological improvements in speed and range, 
reduced operating costs, and more reliable performance in adverse 
weather conditions, the helicopter will find new markets in which it 
can compete economically with existing modes of transportation. 
Second, research conducted by NASA indicates that major break-
throughs in rotorcraft performance can be anticipated. The XV-l 5 
tiltrotor, already in the flight demonstration phase, shows promise of 
providing operational rotorcraft that are capable of flying twice as 
many passenger miles per gallon of fuel as today' s helicopters--at 
twice today' s speed. Similarly, the Advancing Blade Concept (ABCTM) 
research aircraft is demonstrating a simple, direct, and compact 
solution to the problem of providing high speed and agility while 
retaining the stationary hover efficiency of the conventional 
helicopter. Undoubtedly, with a marked improvement in performance, 
rotorcraft should develop entirely new markets during the 1990s. 
Uarket Penetration by Foreign Competition 
The U. S. share of the world rotorcraft market has declined over 
the past 10 years. During the five-year period from 1970 to 1974, U.S. 
companies' share of the sales value of of all helicopters produced in 
the free world was 68 percent. From 1975 to 1979, the U.S. market 
share declined to 53 percent. 5 If this trend is not reversed, U. S. 
manufacturers may soon be selling fewer than half of the helicopters 
in the international market. 
Statistics show why European helicopter manufacturers place great 
emphasis on export. Aerospatiale forecasts that it can expect only 16 
percent of its sales to be in Europe, but 48 percent in the United 
States, and 36 percent in the rest of the world. 6 The prospects of 
Aerospatiale's export drive in relation to U.S. sales are illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 Helicopter Export Values 
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HAINTAINING A SUPERIOR ROTORCRAFT CAPABILITY 
The pressing need for st rengthening U. S. defense as well as the 
market opportunities of rotorcraft are the traditional arguments for 
augmenting NASA's role in rotorcraft research. Horeover, it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that advances in rotorcraft technology 
offer unique benefits to society that provide additional justification 
for government support at this time. 
Support of National Defense 
The realities of the world situation require that the United 
States offset its numerical inferiority with qualitative superiority 
in all types of aircraft. This is particularly critical with regard 
to rotorcraft. The U.S.S.R depends heavily on rotorcraft as a major 
element of its combat forces. Figure 3 shows the growth trend in the 
total rotorcraft inventory for the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
Within this inventory, the U.S.S.R. holds a particularly significant 
advantage in attack and antitank helicopters. The U.S.S.R. also enjoys 
a significant numerical superiority in tanks; they have 40,000, while 
the United States has only 12,000. 7 The ability of the United 
States to successfully support a land-based confrontation in the NATO 
theater is a matter of grave concern. The U. S. Army has identified 
qualitatively superior rotorcraft as a key element in its ground war 
strategy to counter the quantitive inferiority. In addition, 
technical options must be available to respond to threats not now 
clearly defined. During the decade of the 1980s NASA should have a 
critical role in support of the Department of Defense in this area, 
and its program must by dynamic, innovative, and large enough to lay a 
technology base that goes beyond immediately foreseen needs. 
Economic Benefits 
Although the total market for rotorcraft is significantly smaller 
than for fixed-wing aircraft, it is a rapidly growing segment of the 
U.S. aerospace industry. Continued superiority of U.S. civil rotor-
craft, . dependent to a large extent on NASA research and technology, 
could playa critical role in determining the U.S. share of the anti-
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FIGURE 3 Military Rotary Wing Inventory 
cipated large market potential. 
The major U. S. investment in aeronautical technology during the 
last several decades, in which NASA played a leading role, is largely 
responsible for the current world preeminence of the United States in 
the commercial aircraft and general aviation markets. The same atten-
tion to rotorcraft could produce a comparable market response. 
Figure 4 illustrates the situation. 
Support of Societal Needs 
Rotorcraft provide essential support in resource exploration, 
particularly for offshore oil, and in emergency medical services. 
Without helicopters, the international oil industry could not exploit 
effectively its exploration and production activities at the farthest 
reaches off shore. The movement of personnel and equipment by boats 
is slow, uneconomic and frequently hazardous. Indeed, one-third of the 
world's offshore oil supply is dependent on helicopters. 
The cost-effectiveness of helicopters in lifesaving operations can 
be easily substantiated. If one accepts the relatively low societal 
value of a human life at $200,000, as hypothesized by the National 
Highway Commission, the investment in the entire world helicopter fleet 
probably could be justified for its life saving contribution alone. 
Many other societal benefits can be foreseen for advanced rotor-
craft technology in the future. Some of the missions of rotorcraft, 
10 
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along with the importance and value of the new technology, are listed 
in Table 2. So, to cite two examples, a 15 percent increase in speed 
for a standby ambulance helicopter will increase, by more than 30 per-
cent, the area that an emergency medical facility can serve during 15 
minute flights and increased range would increase the offshore areas 
that could be searched for additional oil. 
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TABLE 2 
Mission 
Resource Development 
Disaster Relief 
Medevac 
Police Work 
Short Haul/Commuter 
Lumbering and Industrial 
Applica tions 
Executive Transportation 
Importance 
Currently 33% of world's oil production 
depends upon rotorcraft 
Over 100,000 civilians already saved by 
world's helicopter fleet 
Over 900,000 Med-Evac's in Southeast Asia 
Civilian Med-Evac units showing tremen-
dous Return on Investment (92 docu-
mented lives saved by 1 helo in 6 months) 
Controlled experiments confirm 2 to 6 times 
apprehension rate with helicopters 
Technology of the 1950's struck out: unex-
plored with new technology: runway 
congestion will force shift to VTOL 
Very cost effective in specialized role; will 
expand with greater availability of heavy 
helicopters and more efficient ferry 
capability 
Very fast growing-currently depending on 
door to door advantage but runway con-
gestion will dictate helicopters for airport 
(connection) access 
12 
Value of New Technology 
Higher speeds and longer range to go 
further offshore 
Higher speed and longer range for 
productivity of faster response time 
Speed established radius of action and area 
serviceable (by square of speed) 
Higher speed for faster response. Quieter for 
more surprise and community acceptance 
Higher speeds and productivity, better ride 
comfort, all weather reliability necessary 
to fully exploit potential benefits 
Exploit greater availability of helicopters 
developed for other missions above. 
Twin lift for special situation 
Higher speed and better ride comfort to 
expand market and increase practical 
range 
ROTORCRAFT RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS 
The needs for research and development in the rotorcraft field 
have been thoroughly examined and reported in recent years by the NASA 
Rotorcraft Task Force3 and the ASEB ad hoc Committee on Rotor-
craft. 8 More recently, the Rotorcraft Subcommittee of the NASA 
Advisory Committee supplemented the findings of the earlier studies. 
The conclusions and recommendations of all three groups are still 
applicable, and the research program developed by the NASA Task Force 
is generally endorsed by this panel. Table 3 summarizes the current 
priority research concerns for the 1980s. 
TABLE 3 Priority Rotorcraft Research Needs for the 1980s 
1. Fundamental understanding of rotor/airframe aerodynamic and dynamic phenomena to improve performance and 
reduce vibration and noise by development of: 
• Rotor dynamic analysis techniques 
• Airframe dynamic analysis techniques 
• Understanding of dynamic and aerodynamic interaction of airframe and rotors. 
2. Noise abatement technology to establish acceptable criteria for new designs and the technology to meet them by 
development of: 
• Community noise acceptance criteria 
• Component noise prediction methods 
• Vehicle noise prediction methods 
• Design concepts for quieter components and systems. 
3. Technology to provide base for as yet unformalized military requirements and to increase civil productivity and use-
fulness through higher speeds and heavier lifts by: 
• Winged component helicopter investigation using the RSRA 
• Lifting rotor compound helicopter investigation on ABC 
• Tilt rotor technology development using TRRA 
• Propulsion components optimized for compound and tilt rotor aircraft 
• Studies of heavy lift options including multi-lift .. 
4. Improved operational capability to improve dependability and safety by: 
• Terminal area approach solution equipment for steep gradient, slow approach for: 
- High density terminals 
- Remote and confmed area heliports 
• Active control technology for vibration and gust suppression 
• Self contained guidance and control 
• Better cockpit integration and human factors 
• De-icing criteria and certification facilities 
• De-icing solutions. 
5. Advanced component technology for more efficient, economical and quieter dynamic component building blocks by 
development of: 
• Longer life, quieter transmissions 
• Better fuel consumption in small gas turbines. 
13 
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THE EVOLUTION OF NASA'S CURRENT ROLE IN ROTORCRAFT TECHNOLOGY 
The evolution of rotorcraft began with the first flight of early 
experimental helicopters in the late 1920s although sustained flight 
was not achieved until the late 1930s. Military use of rotorcraft was 
seriously considered during World War II, but it was not until the 
Korean conflict in the early 1950s that rotorcraft made a significant 
military contribution. On the civil side, several pioneering efforts 
during the late 1940s and early 1950s were not fruitful. In the 1950s 
and the 1960s, concerted efforts were made to integrate the latest 
military and civilian rotorcraft technology. This resulted in rapid 
growth of the civilian helicopter sector in the 1970s. More recently, 
civil and military requirements have begun to diverge, resulting in a 
demand for research and development specifically geared either to the 
civil or to the military markets. 
NACA and NASA have made meaningful contributions to rotorcraft 
development. During the 1930s, the fundamental groundwork for rotor 
analysis was developed. During the 1940s and 1950s, ground and flight 
experimental research contributed to a better understanding of flying 
qualities and to improved performance prediction methods. In the 
1960s, as the space program developed, NASA concern with rotorcraft 
diminished. At the start of the decade of the 1970s, NASA rotorcraft 
programs began to accelerate and special attention was paid to build-
ing up facilities for rotorcraft research. Early emphasis was on basic 
research, including the development of analytical methods and rudimen-
tary ground and flight research techniques. 
Significant organizational changes occurred when Army Laboratories 
were established at the Ames Research Center in 1965 and at Langley and 
Lewis in 1970. The joint, coordinated activities of the Army and NASA 
have improved the effectiveness of both programs and have become models 
for other cooperative ventures. Specialized test modules were 
developed for a number of wind tunnels; the Rotor Systems Research 
Aircraft (RSRA) and the Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft (TRRA) were built; 
the Vertical Motion Simulator was started; and a major upgrading was 
initiated for the 40 x BO-foot tunnel to perform full-scale rotor 
research. 
From the 1930s to the late 1960s, the NACA and NASA resources 
allocated for rotorcraft were modest in relation to the total 
15 
aeronautics budget. NASA's commitment to rotorcraft increased with 
formalization of the cooperative program with the Army. The program 
helped foster increased funding of rotorcraft research and technology 
deve1opment--from approximately $5 million at the start of the 1970s 
to approximately $30 million now. An even greater commitment appears 
warranted during the 1980s to perform research on complex rotorcraft 
problems and thereby to strengthen the industry in providing improved 
rotorcraft and staving off increasing foreign competition. Potential 
future budgets are shown in Figure 5, along with the funding recom-
mended in NASA's 1978 report, Advanced Rotorcraft Techno1ogy4. This 
report was extensively reviewed and enthusiastically supported by the 
rotorcraft industry. 
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NASA'S ROLE IN THE FUTURE: 1980 AND BEYOND 
In the sections that follow, the panel reviews the potential roles 
for NASA relating to rotorcraft. NASA's participation is delineated 
for each role as defined in Appendix A, a rationale is provided, the 
current level of activity is summarized, and suggestions are given for 
the kinds of research still needed. The panel's recommendations are 
summarized in Figure 6. . 
NASA ROLE CODE: 
1. Major Role 
-2. Moderate Role 
-3. Minor Role 
-- No Role 
ROLES 
NATIONAL FACILITIES & EXPERTISE 
RESEARCH 
GENERIC TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION 
VEHICLE CLASS TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION 
TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION 
TECHNOLOGY VALIDATION 
PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
OPERATIONS FEASIBILITY 
3 
3 
2 
2 2 
2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
3 3 3 
2 3 3 3 2 3 
elf 8 proposed project or program initially falls in a recommended moderat., minor, or no-role category. but, following 
review of its merits on an individual case basis. is deemed to be a desirable undertaking by virtue of its being in the national 
interest. or mandated by the Congress or as a result of review it is concluded there are other overriding circumstances. then 
NASA's role for that project or program would be elevated to a major one Ii.e .• Category 1), 
FIGURE 6 ROTORCRAFT Role/Discipline Matrix 
National Facilities and Expertise 
Maintaining modern aeronautical research and technology facilities 
and staff with superior technical skills is the core of NASA's role in 
developing technology for rotorcraft application. The rationale for 
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this activity is clear. Because of their complexity, rotorcraft are 
dependent on sub-scale and full-scale testing and, therefore, require 
elaborate wind tunnels and simulators. The Army maintains limited 
rotary-wing research facilities of its own; the Air Force is 
prohibited from helicopter development by a memorandum of 
understanding between the Chiefs of Staff signed in 1966; the Navy, for 
its part, does little rotor research. All things considered, NASA is 
the only agency with the major national facilities required. 
The NASA in-house expertise in rotorcraft technology is currently 
at a low ebb because of transfers and retirements of personnel. Build-· 
ing up the staff to provide the necessary technical skills is essen-
tial. Fortunately, a competent core of Army research personnel working 
within the NASA organization significantly eases the problem. 
The NASA aeronautical facilities to support the development of 
rotorcraft technology are, with some exceptions, superior to those 
available elsewhere in the world. A listing of the facilities is in 
Table 4. In a few functional areas, however, foreign facilities are 
more advanced. Two examples of this are the ONERA (Office National Dr 
Etude et de Recherches Aerospatial, Chatillon, France) capability for 
iCing research in the S-l tunnel (25 ft, 290 knot capability) and the 
new Dutch-German wind tunnel (8 x 6 meter size with 110 meters/sec. 
speed). The latter has the added capability of low ambient noise and 
is the only tunnel in the world considered completely adequate for 
model studies, in reasonable scale, of quiet rotor designs to meet the 
proposed FAA regulation. Several European facilities also excel in 
their provisions for model set-up and quick-change, giving them a 
significant test productivity edge over comparable U.S. facilities. 
TABLE 4 Facilities 
• 40 x 80 Full Scale Tunnel 
• V/STOL Tunnel 
• Ground Based Simulation Facilities 
• Flight Test Facilities 
• Transonic Dynamics Tunnel 
• 7 X 10 Low Speed Tunnel 
• 7 X 10 High Speed Tunnel 
• Variable Density Wind Tunnel 
• Computer Facilities 
• Instrumentation and Fabrication Facilities 
• 6 X 28-inch Tunnel 
• Low Turbulence Pressure Tunnel 
• Structures and Fatigue Laboratory 
• Structural Dynamics Laboratory 
• Impact Dynamics Facility 
• Data Acquisition and Reduction Facilities 
In addition, there are a few unique capabilities that should be 
considered for development by NASA to meet some of the military and 
civil requirements for the decade of the 1980s. These capabilities 
could be developed either by establishing new facilities or by modify-
ing existing ones. In any case, additional in-house personnel are 
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required. Such new facilities include: 
o A dedicated simulator for human factor research during rotor-
craft approach and landing; 
o Rotorcraft icing test facilities for hover and forward flight 
testing; and 
o Better facilities for model and full-scale noise testing. 
Propulsion facilities are available in industry, so, at this time, 
no additional NASA capability is required. The NASA propulsion faci-
lities are well-suited to investigation of small gas turbine engines 
and components; however, they should be modernized. 
The facilities made available to the Army under the joint Army-
NASA agreement on aeronautical research are an integral part of the 
interagency cooperative plan, and these must continue to be available 
for Army use. The benefits realized by use of these facilities have 
been substantial; they have made major contributions to Army helicopter 
research and development programs. 
Research and Generic Technology Evolution 
Basic Research and Generic Technology Evolution in aeronautics are 
clearly fundamental responsibilities of NASA. In the judgment of the 
panel, these responsibilities must be maintained and isolated from any 
pressures to increase down-stream work. 
Again, the rationale is clear. Research and Generic Technology 
Evolution are the life blood of new ideas and fundamental advances, and 
NASA is the only agency in a position to undertake such work for the 
whole aeronautical community. Currently, the rotorcraft sector has not 
been able to take maximum advantage of NASA's basic and generic 
research capabilities partly because of the low level of NASA research 
on rotorcraft through the 1960s, and partly because of retirements of 
much of the in-house, helicopter-oriented NASA research talent. But 
the situation is slowly improving. The affiliation between NASA and 
the Army research organization is a major factor in developing a cri-
tical mass of personnel interested in rotor fundamentals. 
Some typical areas of basic research in which NASA could play a 
significant role include computational aerodynamics, non-intrusive flow 
sensing, vortex-airfoil interaction, fundamental mechanisms of ice 
adherence and erosion susceptibility, high-temperature tribology, voice 
recognition, and materials with significant inherent damping. Areas 
to highlight are noted in Table 3. 
Vehicle Class Technology Evolution 
The ability of NASA personnel to contribute to rotorcraft tech-
nology evolution has been greatly enhanced by their access to and 
interaction with Army personnel, which is fostered by the co-location 
of the NASA and Army Laboratories. This relationship between NASA and 
the largest free-world user of helicopters, assures a high degree 
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of relevance in NASA's work in rotorcraft technology evolution. 
In the field of avionics, as it relates to communication and navi-
gation, operational applications generally fall within the province of 
the FAA in cooperation with the avionics industry. Even so, there is 
a role for NASA in the field of advanced avionics technology develop-
ment. NASA should continue to be in a position to do innovative work 
in this field without necessarily waiting for direction from the FAA. 
A relentless forward movement of the cycle of knowledge and con-
cept generation is imperative. The interruption of the cycle through 
the 1960s undoubtedly contributed to the erosion of U.S. leadership in 
commercial and military helicopters. With the build-up of research 
facilities that took place during the 1970s, NASA now has the 
opportunity and the capability to reverse the downward trend and to 
help the industry reestablish unchallenged world leadership. 
Technology Demonstration 
NASA must continue to play an important role in demonstrating the 
feasibility of new component and system concepts. In rotorcraft, a 
technology demonstration usually must take place in a systems environ-
ment by flight test of research aircraft. Since rotorcraft technology 
is largely empirical, as new concepts of high potential benefit or 
depart from the rotorcraft experience base, the technical risk 
increases rapidly. While small-scale model tests and analyses can 
reduce this risk somewhat, the complexities and interrelationships of 
rotorcraft aerodynamics and structural dynamics are such that technol-
ogy demonstration flight tests are of great value. 
Some of NASA's most important contributions to aeronautics have 
been the result of flight testing research aircraft. These include the 
X-I, the first U.S. aircraft to explore supersonic flight systematic-
ally; the X-S, the first to flight test variable sweep wings; and the 
X-IS, which extended manned flight to hypersonic speeds. All of these 
laid the technological foundation for the many successful U.S. super-
sonic aircraft that followed. In the rotorcraft field, the XV-l com-
pound, the VZ-2 tiltwing, and the XV-3 tiltrotor gave the U.S. an early 
technological lead in high-performance advanced configurations. Unfor-
tunately, this work was not carried to a point where its feasibility 
could be clearly established. 
Hore recently, two new technology demonstration rotorcraft, the 
ABCTH compound and the XV-15 tiltrotor, have extended the technology 
base for low disk-loading Vertical Takeoff or Landing (VTOL) with speed 
capabilities in the range of 300 knots. In a sense, these aircraft 
will perform the function for rotorcraft that the X series of aircraft 
performed for supersonic flight. 
In propulsion, it is important to test engine assemblies in full 
scale. The testing of complete engine systems is a necessary supple-
ment to the investigation of individual components such as compressor, 
combustor, turbine, and fuel controls because of the interactions among 
components. The Energy Efficient Engirie (E3) program is an excel-
lent example of a NASA-sponsored propulsion technology demonstration 
program. A similar role is appropriate for NASA in rotorcraft propul-
sion. 
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In avionics, NASA can play an important role in the demonstration 
of advanced, low cost concepts and advanced technology systems such as 
satellite navigation--e.g., civil application of NAVSTAR Global Posi-
tioning System. With respect to aircraft operations, NASA fulfills 
an important role in support of the FAA, especially in demonstrating 
new concepts such as automatic approach techniques, since these involve 
both operating procedures and aircraft flight control. Another area 
in which NASA must take primary responsibility is in demonstrating 
active control technology and in assisting the FAA in the development 
of software validation procedures for digital fly-by-wire control 
systems. 
Technology Validation 
In some situations, it may be important for NASA to manage large-
scale ground or flight validation programs in order to provide the 
timely transfer of internationally competitive critical technology to 
industry. Because of the high inherent risk in any new rotorcraft 
technology, such programs deserve special attention. Validation 
programs, however, should be selected carefully. They should be 
clearly of national benefit and offer a major opportunity for high 
payoff. NASA should pursue only those programs that attract strong 
broadly based endorsement by industry or the FAA or the DOD. Prior to 
validation, the technology should have been demonstrated sufficiently, 
probably on a smaller scale. 
The rationale for Technology Validation for rotorcraft is as 
follows. In the past, military programs have provided most of the 
technology needs of U. S • civil rotorcraft. However, future military 
rotorcraft design mission requirements are likely to be different in 
some important aspects from 'future civil requirements. Few, if any, 
of the military rotorcraft developments expected in the 1980s will 
provide timely, relevant technology for future civil applications. 
Without prior military validation, application of new technology could 
introduce excessively high risk, thus precluding application, espe-
cially if the cost of providing certification substantiation is high. 
The most advanced technology available will be needed if the next 
generation of u.S. civil rotorcraft is to be competitive with aggres-
sive government-supported foreign competition. Only those nations and 
companies that can supply superior rotorcraft economically will capture 
a significant share of the rotorcraft market of the 1980s and 1990s. 
Timely transfer to U.S. industry of critically needed proven technology 
is essential. Its respected technical competence, coupled with noncom-
petitive relationships with industries, the FAA, and the DOD, uniquely 
qualify NASA for the management of such programs. 
Nothing in the current or proposed NASA rotorcraft program at this 
time appears to fall under the category of Technology Validation except 
some relatively small efforts on heavy-lift helicopter transmissions 
and on the service life of composite structures for rotorcraft. Can-
didates for validation programs include extension to rotorcraft of any 
of the benefits that can be derived from other related programs, such 
.as the Large Composite Primary Aircraft Structures (LCPAS), the Mater-
ials for Advanced Turbine Engines (MATE), and the Engine Components 
Improvements (ECI) programs. A primary focus would be to provide 
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assistance to the first industry user in compiling the data necessary 
for FAA certification, assuming such assistance would produce the non-
proprietary data needed by others to substantially ease subsequent 
certification efforts. 
Another kind of possible validation program (though not necessar-
ily recommended at this time) would be the development of 
size-sensitive component technology for future high speed concepts 
that have been demonstrated only in relatively small size and for 
large rotorcraft concepts that are significantly beyond the current 
design experience. 
The panel agreed that validation programs should not draw away 
significant amounts of funds from the more essential programs that make 
up the Generic Technology Evolution, Vehicle Class Technology Evolu-
tion, and Technology Demonstration levels of NASA efforts. Such 
programs should not be permitted to divert key management attention 
from the NASA role in Research. Accordingly, separate organization 
within NASA aeronautics may be required- to develop the necessary 
management skills and ensure the separation of funds and management 
devoted to technology validation efforts. 
Prototyping 
The design, development, construction, and test of a rotorcraft 
engine or system sufficiently representative of a final product to 
serve as a production prototype is not a role that NASA should under-
take. Should a special case arise of sufficient national importance 
to merit federal sponsorship of the development of a prototype rotor-
craft, NASA's technical and managerial expertise should be considered. 
Such a program would be on an ad hoc basis. 
Operations Feasibility 
With some exceptions, NASA's role in the field of Operations 
Feasibility is considered to be largely in support of the FAA or the 
DoD as tasks are assigned. The DoD and the FAA would assign certain 
tasks to NASA in order to take advantage of NASA's unique facilities, 
equipment and expertise. NASA, in addition, would be expected to ini-
tiate and place a high priority on operations feasibility tasks in the 
fields of aircraft systems, structures, materials, and human factors. 
One rationale for a NASA role in the area of Operations Feasibil-
ity is that the unique rotorcraft configurations or concepts require 
operational validation. NASA has unparalleled capabilities in the 
research vehicles and facilities that are necessary to carry out such 
validation effectively. An example is the evaluation of the tiltrotor 
or the ABC™ in an operational environment. A technology 
demonstrator aircraft would afford the opportunity for experiments to 
determine how this new flight regime could best be applied to civil or 
military operations. 
Although at this time NASA has no rotorcraft operations feasibil-
i ty programs, the need for such programs could develop, particularly 
in the areas of exploration of high-speed vehicles such as the tilt-
rotor and ABC™ and investigation of new civil missions for heavy-
lift vehicles. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations of the panel on NASA roles are summarized in 
Figure 6. 
o Conclusion: Rotorcraft have unique ~esearch facility require-
ment s, and, because of the Army-NASA cooperative agreement, 
NASA is the only government agency currently franchised to 
develop such facilities for rotorcraft. During the 1970s, NASA 
did an excellent job of building up such facilities, though 
some specific additions still are required, particularly to 
reduce noise and rotor icing. 
o Recommendation: NASA should continue its present policy of 
assigning first priority to basic and generic research and to 
the continued upgrading and operation of its unique facilities. 
These basic aspects of the NASA program must not be compromised 
in the face of any expansion of NASA's role elsewhere. The 
importance of thi s role runs across all disciplines wi th the 
possible exception of that portion of avionics related to non-
flight-control, because basic research on component technology 
is probably being addressed adequately by the communications 
industry. Still, there are such basic research areas as 
digital computer software architecture and validation tech-
niques for flight control systems in which NASA has much to 
offer. In addition, development of new NASA wind tunnels for 
acoustic and icing work still requires attention. 
o Conclusion: NASA support of rotorcraft was significant in the 
1950s, but minimal in the 1960s. This has undoubtedly been a 
factor in the recent weakening of the relative U.S. technical 
position in international markets for rotorcraft. In parti-
cular, the evolutionary bridge between generic research and 
rotorcraft demonstration has suffered. 
o Recommendation: In considering the expansion of NASA programs, 
high priority should be assigned to Generic and Vehicle Class 
Technology Evolution. This is true for all disciplines except 
in the communication and navigation aspects of avionics. The 
FAA should take prime responsibility in these areas. NASA 
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could have a unique contribution to make in such areas, how-
ever, in such specific fields as the extension of global 
positioning system technology to precision navigation and 
flight control of rotorcraft. 
o Conclusion: Because of the complex and synergistic interaction 
of all disciplines in rotorcraft problems and because of the 
relative immaturity of the technical base, systems demonstra-
tion will continue to be a key role for any NASA rotorcraft 
program. Frequently, flight tests are the only way to verify 
rotorcraft research results and to demonstrate the practical 
outcome of development work. With its research vehicles and 
full-scale wind tunnel and modules, NASA has the facilities for 
the required program, though staffing has been inadequate to 
fully utilize them. 
o Recommendation: NASA should continue to use Technology Demon-
stration programs as a focus for the output of Rotorcraft Tech-
nology Evolution, but NASA should reexamine its staffing with 
an eye toward filling the gaps. Here again NASA shares a role 
with the FAA, not only in the communications and guidance 
aspects of avionics, but also in any civil operating system 
demonstration. 
o Conclusion: Operations Feasibility is really only a subset of 
Technology Demonstration. Whether or not it is a role for NASA 
depends upon whether interaction with the environment intro-
duces significant uncertainty relating to the practicality or 
readiness of new technology. 
o Recommendation: NASA 'should undertake Operational Feasibility 
work only when it is a key issue in the acceptance of a new 
concept and then only in close cooperation with and in support 
of the user. This is apt to be the case with unusual or unique 
aircraft system configurations when the ability to integrate 
efficiently into an operating scenario can be a critical factor 
in their feasbility. It is also possible to envision a sup-
portive role for NASA in an operations feasibility demonstra-
tion of composite materials or technology in which human 
factors are critical. 
o Conclusion: Technology Validation (risk reduction) can be 
particularly critical for rotorcraft because of their complex-
ity and because of the difficulty in predicting size effects. 
As civil roforcraft develop, their performance and operational 
requirements become less like those of military prototypes and 
consequently, the use of military prototypes for new technology 
risk reduction is becoming less useful. Some means of reducing 
the risk of incorporating and certifying new technology will 
be required if the u.S. industry is to compete in the civil 
market. A possible role for NASA in Technology Validation 
might be to support the industry by providing data for certi-
fication of new technology to the FAA for the first user. This 
would ease the task of certification for the other users that 
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follow. However, this should not be allowed to have a signif-
icant impact on NASA's basic research responsibilities. 
o Recommendation: NASA should undertake sizable Technology 
Validation programs only when; 
The required funds can be made available without reduction 
in fundamental and applied research; 
It is clear that NASA is the best agency for the task, par-
ticularly in light of heavy demands for project management; 
and, 
There is a consensus as to the value and broad application 
of the results. 
The most likely area for NASA Technology Validation efforts is 
in the examination· of the long-term environmental effects on 
composite structures, although there may be specific risks 
associated with electronic flight controls (fly-by-wire) and 
novel aircraft configurations in which risk reduction may be 
required beyond the first level of feasibility demonstration. 
o Conclusion: Industry must assume the risks of prototype 
development for the civilian market and, of course, the DOD 
must continue its normal practice of sponsoring prototype 
development of military equipment. 
o Recommendation: Prototyping of rotorcraft is not an appropri-
ate role for NASA. 
o Conclusion: The rationale for government support of rotorcraft 
starts with the urgent need for technology for military 
superiority and includes the traditional arguments of economic 
benefit and balance of trade. Both areas are of growing 
concern because of an increasing military threat and a civil 
market that is expanding rapidly. But the rationale also can 
extend to include the significant societal benefits to be 
accrued through the use of rotorcraft, such as those related 
to disaster relief, emergency medical services, and other 
public services (police and fire work). 
o Recommendation: In examining opportunities for the most bene-
ficial deployment of its resources, NASA should consider 
societal benefits as well as the military and civil markets in 
formulating and ranking the role it can play to support the 
development of a stronger rotorcraft technology base. 
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APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS OF ROLES AND DISCIPLINES 
To facilitate the task undertaken by the participants in the ASEB 
workshop, a series of definitions of possible roles for NASA was 
developed. The roles represent steps in the hierarchy of the research 
and development process, beginning with a desire for knowledge and an 
understanding of basic phenomena, an idea, or technical concept, and 
ending with the design and construction of a vehicle, a vehicle compo-
nent, or a new operational system. 
Definitions of Possible Roles for NASA 
Each of the following eight roles as defined by NASA was reviewed 
by the participants, and the panels considered the extent to which NASA. 
should carry out these roles. 
National Facilities and Expertise 
This category comprises the development and maintenance of test 
facilities, including wind tunnels, simulators, and computers, as well 
as the maintenance of personnel with specialized skills, technical 
knowledge, and expertise in the field of aeronautics. 
Research 
Programs in this category are designed to gain basic knowledge and 
understanding of physical phenomena and processes in all discipline 
areas relevant to aeronautics. The work is fundamental in character 
and is performed within NASA, at universities, in industry, and by 
independent research organizations. 
Generic Technology Evolution 
This category involves the pursuit of the results of specific lines 
of basic research that show promise of generating technology broadly 
applicable to a number of classes of vehicles. The work is evolution-
ary in nature and leads to the continued advancement of technology. 
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Such advances generally precede focused technology development in sup-
port of specific vehicle clas~eeds. The work is conducted primarily 
within NASA, with appropripte university and industry support. 
Vehicle Class Technology Evolution 
NASA programs in this category concentrate on specific vehicle 
classes and on the preparation of the unique technology data base 
required to improve the design and development of certain classes of 
aircraft. Activities include generating and evaluating new concepts 
and configuration approaches for the vehicle classes. Examples include 
V/STOL and supersonic cruise vehicles. In both cases, the technologies 
unique to those classes of aircraft are examined with regard to design 
feasibility, benefits, costs, etc. Then tailored data bases are 
developed. 
Technology Demonstration 
This category includes programs that are conducted to demonstrate 
the technical feasibility of a technology advance or concept. Activi-
ties may include flight testing and component or systems demonstra-
tions. Specific examples in the current NASA program are: Tilt-Rotor 
Research Aircraft, Energy Efficient Engine, Quiet Short-Haul Research 
Aircraft, and Terminal Configured Vehicle. Future modifications and 
tests on an aircraft to demonstrate the feasibility of Laminar Flow 
Control and flight tests of an Advanced Turboprop would be included in 
Technology Demonstration. 
Technology Validation 
This comprises programs that include large-scale ground or flight 
validation as a necessary step to assure technology transfer. The 
purpose is to make possible, with minimal risk and without additional 
technology development, the practical utilization of high-benefit, 
high-risk conceptual, component, or subsystem technology advances. 
Specific examples in the present NASA program are: Composite Primary 
Aircraft Structure (CPAS), Materials for Advanced Turbine Engine 
(MATE), and Engine Component Improvement (ECI). 
Prototype Development 
This category consist s of design, development, construction, and 
testing of an aircraft, engine, or system that is sufficiently repre-
sentative of a planned final product to serve as a production proto-
type. An example of such a program for the civil sector would be the 
supersonic transport (SST) program conducted by the FAA during the 
196'Os. Current NASA programs do not include any prototype develop-
ments, and none is currently planned. 
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Operations F~~8ibility 
This refers to operations conducted as research directed tmJard 
evaluating the feasibility or practicality of aircraft system opera-
tions to meet special needs or requirements or to demonstrate that a 
total, integrated operational system (e.g., new aircraft or simulated 
nell aircraft, advanced integrated flight systems, approach and landing 
techniques, wake vortex alleviation, etc.) provides a service or bene-
fj t. The economic, environmental, and/or social aspects are consid-
ered. 
Definitions of Disciplines 
Aerodynamics 
Aerodynamics is the science dealing with the motion of air and 
other gases and with the effects of such motion on objects moving 
through such media. 
Structures and Materials 
This is the portion of aeronautical research and technology devel-
opment dealing with the design of structures (the part of the air-
craft, missiles and/or their components whose function is to carry 
loads in the broadest sense) and the materials used in aircraft and 
missile construction. 
Propulsion 
This disciplinary heading includes the part of aeronautical 
research and technology development relating to the various methods 
and systems for generating and delivering power for propelling and/ 
or lifting aircraft and missiles. 
Electronics and Avionics 
Electronics refers to that aircraft and missile electrical equip-
ment that is required for the basic operation of the vehicles--
e.g., flight and engine controls. Avionics means the electrical 
equipment used for mission functions, such as air-to-ground com-
munications and navigation. In military aircraft and missiles, the 
latter category includes offensive and defensive equipment and 
weapons control systems. 
Vehicle Operations 
This area deals directly with operational problems encountered by 
aircraft and missiles, such as icing, detection and dissemination 
of weather information, and air traffic control systems. 
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Human Engineering 
This discipline addresses the study of human capabilities and 
problems that occur at the interfaces between the crew and the 
aircraft. It includes work on and use of simulators, ,crew work-
load studies, and studies of the optimization of cockpit instrumen-
tation and controls. 
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